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The Rule of the Market: Economic Constitutionalism Understood Sociologically 
Sabine Frerichs 
 
Abstract 
 
Setting out from the works of Max Weber and Karl Polanyi, this chapter outlines a sociology of 
economic constitutionalism. The starting point is a functional definition of economic constitution 
as the law constituting the market order, no matter if it is public or private, national or 
international, official or informal law. Economic constitutionalism is understood as a system of 
thought, which emphasises the role of a liberal economic constitution in integrating the global 
economy. 
Adapting Weber’s ideal-typical method, the economic constitution is conceived as a 
constitutional ideal type, next to juridical constitution, political constitution, social constitution, 
and security constitution. Sociologically speaking, these ideal types capture different 
constitutional rationalities, which are all culturally significant but not equally successful in the 
global age. 
Drawing on Polanyi’s work, which exposes the self-regulating market as an artefact of economic 
thinking, the argument proceeds by highlighting the constitutive role of economics in 
constructing the law of the globalised market society. After economic law came to be embedded 
in national welfare states in the twentieth century, economic constitutionalism furthers the 
opening up of national laws and economies. In contrast to the rule of law, the rule of the market is 
inherently transnational in character. 
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The Economic Sociology of Law: From Weber to Polanyi 
This chapter outlines a sociology of economic constitutionalism from the viewpoint of the 
economic sociology of law. I will start with some notes on terminology. The subject of analysis is 
‘economic constitutionalism’, which means a system or school of thought (-ism) in which the role 
of a liberal economic constitution is emphasised. An ‘economic constitution’ can be understood 
in different, formal or functional, terms. In a narrow, legal understanding, it refers only to those 
elements of the economic order, which are codified in the formal constitution of a state. In a 
wider, economic understanding, it extends to all legal rules that together constitute the economic 
order of a state as well as to non-legal norms, which are subject to informal sanctions only. Along 
these lines, an economic constitution can be national, international, supranational or transnational 
in character. 
 
In this chapter, economic constitution is understood in functional rather than in formal terms: as 
the ‘law of the market’, of the ‘market economy’, or ‘market society’. Its primary reference point 
is the economic system and not the legal system. However, the system of thought, or ideology, of 
economic constitutionalism does prominently include the juridical dimension. It promotes the 
‘juridification’ of economic constitutions, that is, their prioritisation and proliferation through 
‘higher law’. In this regard, we can also speak of the ‘constitutionalisation’ of the law of market 
society. 
 
The analytical starting point of this chapter is in sociology and, more precisely, in a sociology 
which regards the law and the economy, as well as law and economics, as its legitimate subjects. 
This includes perspectives from general sociology, economic sociology, and legal sociology, 
which all merge in the ‘economic sociology of law’. The economic sociology of law is located 
between three established disciplines (economics, sociology, jurisprudence) and three 
interdisciplinary research fields (economy and society, law and society, law and economy). It is a 
‘holistic’ venture focusing on the relations of law and economy in society. 
 
Economic constitutions were already a matter of interest in my doctoral thesis (Frerichs 2008). 
Shortly after, this research topic became linked with the perspective of the economic sociology of 
law (Frerichs 2009). My postdoctoral thesis then evolved around the question “what constitutes 
the market society?” (Frerichs 2012). The most straightforward answer would be ‘the law’. 
However, the ‘constitution of market society’ refers not only to the legal constitution of the 
economy, which is an economy centred around markets, but also to the economic constitution of 
the law, which creates and regulates these markets. 
 
Importantly, a sociological understanding of the constitution of market society goes beyond the 
formal and substantive aspects of economic constitutions, which are emphasised, respectively, in 
law and economics. Indeed, ‘constitution’ can also mean ‘construction’, which refers less to the 
normative than to the cognitive dimension of how the market society is envisioned and enforced. 
A sociological concept of the “social and political constitution of the economy” thus includes the 
idea “that any economy, of whatever society, is socially and politically constructed, and that such 
construction, and reconstruction, takes place continuously in the course of social and political 
development” (Beckert and Streeck 2008: 12-13). 
 
Varying this, one can speak of the legal construction of the economy, and of economic 
rationalities, as much as of the economic construction of the law, and of legal reasoning. The 
economic sociology of law may thus ask “in what ways, if any, are the cognitive infrastructures 
of markets – and therefore the particular forms of calculative rationality characteristic of such 
markets – created, entrenched, and mobilized through law and legal practices?” (Lang 2013: 170) 
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Alternatively, it may start from the opposite end, including the important observation that 
“concepts of law and justice are increasingly defined in economic terms and understood through 
the lens of market efficiency” (Edelman 2004: 182; original emphasis). 
 
In this chapter, I will draw two important strands of my work together, which outline a sociology 
of economic constitutionalism. The first strand starts from the work of Max Weber and, in 
particular, it builds on his method of ideal types. This methodology is reflected, in its latest form, 
in Weber’s posthumously published work Economy and Society (1978 [1922]) that also contains 
his “sociology of law”, which is actually concerned with the relation between “economy and law” 
(ibid., Part Two, Ch. VIII). This makes Weber a pioneer of an integrated view on law, economy, 
and society – and, hence, of the economic sociology of law. Not surprisingly, then, his work has 
been emphasized in the rediscovery of this field of intersections (Swedberg 2003; 2006). Using 
Weber’s ideal-typical method, the economic constitution will be identified as one of a range of 
four or five ‘constitutional ideal types’ which are all culturally significant but not equally 
successful in the global age (Frerichs 2010). 
 
The second strand developed in this chapter takes the work of Karl Polanyi as its starting point 
and lays particular emphasis on the problem of embeddedness. In his famous book The Great 
Transformation (1957 [1944]), Polanyi summarises his idea and critique of the market society as 
follows: “Instead of economy being embedded in social relations, social relations are embedded 
in the economic system.” (ibid.: 57) Social embeddedness of the economy, and of markets in 
particular, is considered the ‘normal’ case throughout history and taken as a normative standard 
to pinpoint processes of ‘disembedding’ or ‘re-embedding’. In contrast, the modern market 
society is characterised by the “embeddedness of economic markets in economics” (Callon 
1998). In other words, the market is a scientific artefact. Extrapolation of Polanyi’s argument to 
the law of market society allows developing an economic sociology of law, which highlights the 
intellectual foundations of economic constitutionalism (Frerichs 2011; 2016). 
 
 
Weber’s Sociology of Law and the Method of Ideal Types 
Max Weber (1864-1920) started his career as a legal scholar and ended it as a sociologist. In fact, 
his academic life could be divided into three phases: a legal one, an economic one, and a 
sociological one, and in all of them, historical perspectives played an important role (Swedberg 
2006, 74). The link between legal and sociological terminology in Weber’s work is obvious. As a 
variation on Nietzsche’s famous phrase (2005 [1872]), Gephart (2003) speaks of “the birth of 
sociology from the spirit of jurisprudence”. In his attempt to make a “Case for an Economic 
Sociology of Law”, Swedberg (2003) holds that “[t]he thinker […] who has made the most 
sustained attempt to establish the general relationships between law and the economy from a 
sociological perspective is Max Weber” (ibid.: 11). In fact, Weber’s work already contains the 
key elements of a research programme in the economic sociology of law. His approach to the law 
and the economy as well as their interrelations is genuinely sociological. 
 
Weber considers legal theory and legal sociology as distinct endeavours, one dealing with the 
legal order as it ought to be (normative validity), and one considering how it actually is, that is, 
how it works in practice and namely affects social action (empirical validity). From a sociological 
point of view, legal order thus “refers not to a set of norms of logically demonstrable correctness, 
but rather to a complex of actual determinants [...] of human conduct” (Weber 1978 [1922]: 312). 
Comparing the viewpoints of “legal dogmatics” and “interpretive sociology”, Weber (1981 
[1913]: 159) claimed: “It is the inevitable fate of all sociology that it must very often use rigorous 
legal expressions (rigorous because based on the logical interpretation of norms) for the 
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investigation of the actual action, which is in continual transition between the ‘typical’ cases of 
action, in order, then, to substitute its own meaning for the essentially different legal meaning.” 
This principle is well demonstrated in Weber’s opus magnum Economy and Society (1978 
[1922]), which is full of ‘legalistic’ definitions. In this work, Weber combines a macro-
sociological approach, which focuses on the development and characteristics of social collectives, 
with a micro-sociological approach, which starts from the meaning that individuals attach to their 
action and interaction. At its core is the method of sociological ideal types, which makes it 
possible to systematise and classify cultural differences in historical comparison, but which also 
sheds light on the differentiated value spheres and rationalities that coexist and compete in 
modern society. As a means of cultural reflection and self-reflection, ideal types help to answer 
the question that was at the core of Weber’s work: “What is the constitution of modern society, 
and how did this particular type of society emerge?” (Lindbekk 1992: 295).  
Weber developed his method of ideal types “in several stages” (ibid.: 287), moving from an 
ideographic ideal to a more nomothetic understanding of the science of culture (Albert 2007: 61-
62). His ideal-typical method thus developed from the description of singular cases to the 
systematic study of (modern) society in historical and cross-cultural perspective. In Weber’s 
earlier, more ‘inductive’ period of work, ideal-types emerged from the study of the historical 
material. In his famous essay on “The ‘Objectivity’ of Knowledge in Social Science and Social 
Policy” (2004 [1904]), he emphasised “our ability and need for conceptually ordering empirical 
reality in such a manner as to lay claim to validity as experiential truth” (ibid.: 365; original 
emphasis). On this account, ideal types help to identify cultural ideas that are effective – albeit 
not necessarily fully realized – in practice. They are realistic inasmuch as “the features so 
characterized are taken from significant parts of our lived culture and rendered into a unified 
ideal image” (ibid.: 388). In Weber’s later, more ‘deductive’ period of work, the heuristic 
function of certain generalised sets of ideal types became more dominant. As Lindbekk (1992: 
295) notes, “[e]ach single group” of ideal types then “presents a complete classification system”, 
which facilitates historical and cross-cultural comparison. Arguably, these ideal types stand not 
only for different types of orders prevailing in different types of societies but also for the 
competing principles of order at work in modern society itself. In a Weberian perspective, the 
“constitution of modern society” could thus be described as an “interplay between various 
organized interests articulated through meaning-complexes”, which may be captured “with the 
help of generalized [ideal] types” (ibid.). 
This strategy can be illustrated with examples taken from the sociology of law enclosed in 
Weber’s Economy and Society (1978 [1922]). The first example is Weber’s classification of 
social action according to the ideal types of (a) instrumentally rational, (b) value rational, (c) 
affectual, and (d) traditional action. All social action can thus be interpreted (verstehen) and 
explained (erklären) according to this “basic set of pure cases” (Rex 1977: 163), which forms the 
cornerstone of Weber’s micro-sociological theory of action. The second example is Weber’s 
taxonomy of forms of legitimate order and domination. In contrast to the previous set of ideal 
types, the present set is more macro-sociologically oriented. However, as the terminology shows, 
both classification systems are closely related: “The actors may ascribe legitimacy to a social 
order by virtue of: (a) tradition: valid is that which has always been; (b) affectual, especially 
emotional, faith: valid is that which is newly revealed or exemplary; (c) value-rational faith: 
valid is that which has been deduced as an absolute; (d) positive [instrumental] enactment which 
is believed to be legal.” (ibid.: 36; original emphasis). The third example concerns the law itself. 
Again, Weber arrives at a set of four ideal types, which includes formal and substantive as well as 
rational and irrational forms of law (ibid.: 656-657). Modern Western law comes closest to the 
ideal type of formal rational law, which is based on formally determined and generally applicable 
norms – hence, on legality. In contrast, substantive rational law is based on value rational belief 
systems, including natural law; substantive irrational law is based on authoritative, ethical or 
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pragmatic, case-by-case reasoning; and formal irrational law on charismatic or religious 
revelation, including oracles, prophecy, and magic (cf. Gephart 1993: 519-522). 
 
 
Constitutional Ideal Types in the Global Age: Statics 
Weber’s ideal types of legitimate order, which form part of his sociology of the state, and his 
ideal types of law, which form part of the sociology of law, could be developed into ideal types 
of the political constitution but less so of the economic constitution, whose reference point is not 
the state but the economy. The term ‘economic constitution’ (Wirtschaftsverfassung) appears in 
the German original of Economy and Society (1978 [1922]) and is even listed in the index, but it 
is not developed as a concept and plays no role in the English translation. Weber’s notion of 
constitution is related to ‘organisation’ (Verband), which includes the state (Staatsverband) and 
then pertains to “the law of the state” or “the state’s legal order” (ibid.: 49). At the same time, his 
notion of ‘order’ (Ordnung) covers political, legal and economic orders alike, which may coexist 
and overlap: “The fact that, in the same social group, a plurality of contradictory systems of order 
may all be recognized as valid, is not a source of difficulty for the sociological approach” (ibid.: 
32). 
 
Weber is most concerned with the interaction of economic and legal orders, and the empirical 
connection between capitalism and the rule of law, or “the modern economic order” and “the 
legal compulsion of the state” (ibid.: 65; cf. ibid.: 329). In its broadest sense, the idea of an 
economic constitution is thus covered by Weber’s notion of ‘economic order’; in a more specific 
sense it is represented by his notions of ‘economic regulation’ (Wirtschaftsregulierung) and 
‘market regulation’ (Marktregulierung) (ibid.: 82 and 351). Market regulation is defined as “the 
state of affairs where there is a substantive restriction, effectively enforced by the provisions of 
an order, on the marketability of certain potential objects of exchange or on the market freedom 
of certain participants”, be it through tradition, by convention, or by law (ibid.: 82-83). Besides 
“various types of formal and substantive regulation of [private] economic activity”, modern states 
regulate the national economy through their own economic activities (i.e., the public economy), 
the monetary order (Geldverfassung), and foreign trade policy (ibid.: 193-194). 
 
In order to develop the economic constitution as a Weberian ideal type, it can be distinguished 
from other ‘constitutional ideal types’. Drawing on Tuori’s The Many Constitutions of Europe 
(2010), the economic constitution can be distinguished from and compared with the political 
constitution, the social constitution, the security constitution, and the juridical constitution. 
Interpreted as constitutional ideal types, these capture different systems of order, which were, 
arguably, relatively integrated in the classical framework of the nation state but become more 
differentiated “in post-national times” (Blokker 2012). Tuori (2015: 9; original emphasis) speaks 
of a “constitutional relation between constitutional law and its object of regulation: that is, a 
constitutional object”. The different constitutional ideal types thus relate to different social 
spheres or areas of regulation, namely the economy, the polity, the community, security, and the 
law itself (cf. ibid.: 23-24). Leaving out the juridical constitution, which represents law’s ‘formal 
rationality’, this set of constitutional ideal types captures different ‘substantive rationalities’ of 
the law (Weber 1978 [1922]: 809), which can be classified, among other ways, in terms of their 
respective ‘models of man’, or the individual, and their ‘models of society’, or the collective 
(Frerichs 2010). 
 
The concept of the economic constitution is prominently connected with ordoliberalism, an 
economic school of thought, which emphasises the functional link between economic and legal 
order. In this context, the state guarantees the legal framework for a free and competitive market 
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economy. The main purpose of this ‘order’ (ordo) is to constrain undue economic power by 
public as well as private actors. As a sociological ideal type, the economic constitution 
emphasises individuals over collectives. The model of man which underpins this is the homo 
economicus, a self-interested actor who maximises his or her own benefit. The model of society 
which determines it is market society, where market exchange is the overriding principle of social 
organisation. The reference system is, at least in principle, the global economy. 
 
As to the political constitution, we can start from Weber’s understanding of legitimate order and 
domination, as it is applied to the modern state. Under conditions of formal rationalisation, the 
rule of law limits, legalises and legitimises state power. However, the political constitution goes 
further in establishing democracy, or the self-government of the people. In contrast to the 
economic constitution, the emphasis of the political constitution is not on economic freedoms, but 
on political rights. The model of man that supports the political constitution is homo politicus 
who engages in other-oriented communicative action rather than in self-interested strategic 
action. The model of society that informs it is civil society, an “associative democracy” (Hirst 
1994). The reference system can be a national or transnational polity. 
 
The concept of the social constitution is related to the “social life-world” (Tuori 2010: 10). It 
reflects “social values” and may take the form of “social rights”, which links it to the modern 
welfare state (ibid.: 24). The model of society associated with the ideal type of the social 
constitution is a solidary community which builds on mutually binding normative commitments. 
Whereas traditional, closely integrated communities are characterised by very concrete forms of 
solidarity, highly differentiated modern societies rely on more abstract forms of solidarity. The 
respective model of man is the classic homo sociologicus, which can be described as an over-
socialised, norm-abiding individual. The reference system is typically a national community. 
The function of the security constitution is to protect and defend the public order against threats 
both from without and within, aiming at hostile foreign powers on the international level as well 
as potentially dangerous individuals on the domestic level. Since the security constitution may 
justify excessive restrictions or even repression, Tuori (ibid.: 25) also characterises it as an “anti-
constitution” which is at odds with the rule of law, or the principle of a constitutional state 
(Rechtsstaat). The model of society associated with this ideal type is the control society. The 
model of man is “someone who is eminently governable”, that is, a subject which is directly or 
indirectly controlled by the state (Foucault 2008: 270). The main reference system is national 
government. 
 
 
Constitutionalisation Beyond the Nation State: Dynamics 
This taxonomic set of constitutional ideal types does not yet say anything about the dynamics of 
constitutionalisation, namely processes of ‘sectoral constitutionalisation’ within and beyond the 
state. In his recent book, Tuori distinguishes between two ‘framing constitutions’: political and 
juridical constitutions, and three ‘sectoral constitutions’: economic, social, and security 
constitutions. With regard to the framing constitutions he extrapolates from the classic 
understanding of a “state constitution” which establishes the state’s “political and legislative 
sovereignty” (ibid.: 25). How this sovereignty is used – for example, to regulate economic, social, 
and security matters – is, again classically speaking, outside the purview of constitutional law: 
“sectoral policy fields […], as a rule, do not enjoy constitutional dignity” (ibid.). This is different 
in the European constitution and the European constitutionalisation process, which is interspersed 
with sectoral constitutionalisation. Here, the “functional primacy of the economic constitution” 
has, without doubt, left its mark (ibid.: 26). In European law, the fundamentals of the single 
market and the monetary union do enjoy constitutional dignity, which is generally respected by 
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the member states. This bears witness to the transnational dimension of ‘economic 
constitutionalisation’. 
 
The analytics of constitutional ideal types differs from the narrative of classical constitutionalism 
first of all in that there is not one ‘holistic’ constitution but that there are many ‘partial’ ones. 
Moreover, there is no single act of foundation, in which the constitutive power appears on stage, 
but a functionally differentiated process of constitutionalisation, which seems to follow a logic of 
its own. The question is how the economic constitution stands out in this context and how, 
perhaps, it drives sectoral constitutionalisation. 
 
There are two major discourses that specifically address the plurality of constitutional orders 
‘beyond the nation state’: constitutional pluralism and societal constitutionalism. The first 
discourse, constitutional pluralism, aims to overcome “state-centredness” in constitutional 
theorising; however, its interest in “new forms of legal rule and political community in and 
between sub-state, transstate, supra-state and other non-state units and processes” still reveals a 
certain preoccupation with the political and juridical dimension of constitutionalism (Walker 
2002: 320). In the European context, constitutional pluralism thus focuses on how sovereignty is 
‘divided’ between the national and supranational level, and between different member states. 
Even though sovereignty is redefined “in non-exclusive terms”, which allows including “polities 
whose posited boundaries are not (or not merely) territorial, but also sectoral or functional” (ibid.: 
346), sectoral constitutionalisation still plays a subordinate role in this discourse. This is different 
in the second discourse, societal constitutionalism, which takes the principle of functional 
differentiation as a starting point. Accordingly, law can only aspire to ‘regulate’ the subject 
matter of other social spheres by adopting the language, or rationality, of the respective 
subsystems. Since the functional logic of ‘non-political polities’, such as “the economy, […] 
science, education, health, art or sports” is not confined to national territories but ideally 
globalised (Fischer-Lescano and Teubner 2004: 1015), the law of these subsystems is globalised 
as well: “The national differentiation of law is now overlain by sectoral fragmentation.” (ibid.: 
1008) In the end, the ‘new’ polities constitutionalise themselves by establishing reflexive 
mechanisms of law-making specific to their own rationalities (ibid.: 1016). 
 
Tuori’s theorem of ‘the many constitutions’ (2010; 2015) takes inspirations from both these 
discourses and actually mediates between the two. In focusing on sectoral constitutionalisation it 
draws on societal constitutionalism, whose reference point is the functionally differentiated world 
society. At the same time, it preserves the interest of constitutional pluralism in the particularities 
of the European polity. Bridging these two discourses, Tuori’s approach makes it possible to 
situate Europe’s constitution between the opposite poles of nation-state constitutions and global 
civil constitutions. This, in turn, promotes a better understanding of the fragmented logic of the 
constitutionalisation process. 
 
If we combine the principles of territorial and functional differentiation, we obtain a grid of three 
territorial affiliations (nation, Europe, world) and four or five functional specifications (economy, 
polity, solidarity, security, law). In order to understand the dynamics of sectoral 
constitutionalisation beyond the state, it helps to compare the constitutional ideal types with 
regard to their globalisation potential. For this, we can draw on the models of man (homo 
economicus, homo politicus, homo sociologicus, homo gubernabilis) and models of society 
(market society, civil society, solidary community, control society) connected with the different 
constitutional ideal types. The ideal types of the economic and the political constitution are  
marked by a focus on individuals and a bottom-up logic of social organisation. In contrast, the 
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ideal types of the social and the security constitution are characterised by a focus on collectives 
and a top-down logic of social organisation. 
 
If one looks at how the four constitutional ideal types perform in practice, it can easily be seen 
that social and security constitutions have so far been biased towards national collectives. 
Security has been connected with the monopoly of force of the modern nation state, and 
solidarity has been confined, in its organised form, to the national community. However, more 
recent notions of ‘security community’ (Adler and Barnett 1998) and ‘network solidarity’ 
(Münch and Frerichs 2008) also point beyond this strictly national framework, towards more 
regional and transnational integration. In contrast, economic and political constitutions empower 
individual actors not only within but ideally also beyond national borders and may thus further 
the development of transnational polities. However, there is an important difference between the 
two: markets are based on strategic action and, thus, they operate much more easily on a global 
scale than associations which are premised on communicative action. In other words, a globalised 
market economy is normatively less demanding than a global civil society. The globalisation 
potential is, therefore, greatest for the economic constitution. 
 
On this basis, if observed through the lens of the different constitutional ideal types, the European 
constitution evolves between the unitary constitutional logic of the nation state and the 
fragmentary constitutional logic of world society. Quite evidently, the economic constitution has 
reached the most advanced position on the path of sectoral constitutionalisation. In this respect, 
functional differentiation clearly trumps territorial differentiation, as evidenced by the wide 
applicability of the principle of free movement, which is at the core of market integration. The 
opposite can be observed for the social constitution, which is still, by and large, nationally 
determined, despite the fact that ‘national’ social rights already have to be balanced with 
‘European’ economic freedoms. 
 
So far we have studied the economic constitution in comparison to other partial constitutions, 
their ideal-typical characteristics and performance in the global age. In the following, we will 
focus on how economic constitutionalism informs and shapes the modern market society. This 
requires moving from a Weberian to a Polanyian approach. 
 
 
Polanyi’s Economic Sociology and the Problem of Embeddedness 
Karl Polanyi (1886-1964) started his career as a doctor of law, but he later earned his reputation 
as an economic sociologist and anthropologist. Law does play a role in The Great Transformation 
(Polanyi 1957 [1944]), but it is not systematically developed, neither as a subject matter nor as an 
analytical category. Hence, in contrast to Weber, Polanyi makes no meaningful contribution to 
the sociology of law. However, he shares with Weber a historical-comparative macro-
sociological approach, which, as such, lends itself to exploring the interconnections between law, 
economy and society. Accordingly, it does not seem too far-fetched to respond to Swedberg’s 
(2003; 2006) initiative by making a Polanyian case for the economic sociology of law (Frerichs 
2011). 
 
A Polanyian approach to the ‘law of market society’ and ‘law’s great transformation’ (Frerichs 
2016) has indeed much to offer for a sociology of economic constitutionalism. This is not least 
the case because Polanyi’s economic sociology already includes a “sociology of economics” 
(Zafirovski 2001) – that is, a sociology of the economic discipline, which can be extended to 
studying the interplay of law and economics in inventing and implementing the market society. 
To illustrate this, we have to start from the concept of ‘embeddedness’, which is closely 
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connected with Polanyi’s name and has become a trademark of economic sociology more 
generally. 
 
In The Great Transformation (1957 [1944]: 57), Polanyi uses the concept of embeddedness to 
describe how, in traditional societies, the “economy [is] embedded in social relations” and how, 
in the market society, “social relations are embedded in the economic system”. The 
embeddedness approach distinguishes economic sociology, which is ‘institutionalist’ in its 
nature, from economic theory, which furthers, at least in its neoclassical mainstream, a 
‘disembedded’ view of the market economy. In sociological theorising, one can distinguish 
between four analytical levels of embeddedness: the micro-level of actors, the meso-level of 
relations, the macro-level of regimes, and the meta-level of rationalities (Frerichs 2009). Whereas 
‘old’ economic sociology, as spearheaded by Karl Polanyi, focuses on the macro- and meta-levels 
of regimes and rationalities, ‘new’ economic sociology, as inspired by Mark Granovetter (1985), 
lays more emphasis on the micro- and meso-levels of actors and relations (Frerichs 2011). 
 
The institutional pattern that distinguishes market society from pre-market societies is that market 
exchange has become a dominant form of social organisation (Polanyi 1957 [1944]: 56-57). In 
the market society, markets are normatively disembedded from society but cognitively embedded 
in liberal economic thinking. This is already suggested by the above quote, which contrasts the 
‘social embeddedness of the economy’ with the ‘economic embeddedness of society’. However, 
this only makes sense when one interprets the relation between economy and society not only in 
ontological terms but also in epistemological terms. 
 
What is characteristic about the market society, then, is that it is understood – or constructed – in 
economic terms. Polanyi (ibid.: 57) speaks of “the running of society as an adjunct to the 
market”. For him, this undermines the very foundations of society and is, thus, the road to 
catastrophe. Whereas the embedded economy had prevailed, albeit in different forms, throughout 
the history of mankind, the deregulated or disembedded market economy creates an exceptional 
and ‘anomical’ state of society that calls for concerted efforts of re-regulation and ‘re-
embedding’. Based on these observations, one can distinguish between ‘cognitive embeddedness’ 
and ‘normative embeddedness’ (Frerichs 2011). Whereas the former focuses on the meta-level of 
rationalities and its epistemic effects on actors, relations and regimes, the latter is mainly about 
the macro-level of regimes and its normative impact on micro- and meso-level phenomena. 
Cognitive embeddedness defines a fundamental condition of all economies whereas normative 
embeddedness provides a contingent value standard for certain economies. Economies are 
‘always embedded’ in the sense that they are moral, scientific or cultural constructions, which are 
usually unquestioned but which also remain historically contingent. But economies are also 
‘more or less embedded’ when measured by the moral, scientific or cultural standards that are 
institutionalised in a given society. Put differently, cognitive embeddedness focuses on how 
economy and society are, first of all, constructed and counterposed, and normative embeddedness 
focuses on the institutional settings that interconnect and integrate the two. In this sense, 
cognitive and normative embeddedness do not necessarily contradict each other. 
 
With regard to the constitutive role of economics in bringing about the modern market society, 
Polanyi’s chapter on “Political Economy and the Discovery of Society” (1957 [1944]: Ch. 10) is 
most instructive. His emphasis is here not only the discovery of society as a subject matter, but 
also the discovery of a science which both re-discovers and re-constructs society according to the 
laws of the market: the science of political economy, or what later became the discipline of 
economics. What the economic discipline discovered were “the laws governing a complex 
society” (ibid.: 83), or, rather, “the laws governing a market economy” (ibid.: 125). From a 
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constructivist point of view, economic theory actually creates the economic laws, or rationalities, 
that are then ‘found’ in economic reality. While Polanyi acknowledges the laudable intentions of 
a ‘science’ of national wealth and social welfare, he is deeply concerned with the real-life 
consequences of the “utopian experiment” of the market society (ibid.: 81 and 250). Besides its 
very visible social effects, this includes its effects on “our social consciousness” (ibid.: 83), 
producing what he later referred to as “Our obsolete market mentality” (Polanyi 1996 [1947]). 
 
Against this backdrop, a Polanyian approach to the law of market society would focus not only 
on law’s embeddedness in the economy as a field of actors, relations and regimes, but also on 
law’s embeddedness in the discipline of economics, which provides this field with its distinctive 
economic rationality. An approach that emphasises the cognitive dimension of embeddedness 
and, in particular, the role of scientific constructions, reflects Polanyi’s interest in the perilous 
effects of economic orthodoxy, and in the role of economic science in shaping market society 
more generally. This naturally leads to an understanding of economic sociology as a sociology of 
economics and, consequently, of the economic sociology of law as a sociology of law and 
economics, which is at the roots of the sociology of economic constitutionalism. 
 
 
The Law of Market Society: Disembedded and Commodified 
Even though the role of the law is somewhat neglected in The Great Transformation (Polanyi 
1957 [1944]), the different stages of legal development that this ‘transformation’ implies can be 
induced from the overall argument (Frerichs 2011). Accordingly, pre-modern economies were 
still embedded in an organic complex of “custom and law, magic and religion” (ibid.: 55). This 
means that the law itself was also embedded in social beliefs and practices. In contrast, the 
modern market economy has been liberated from many of these constraints, and it builds on the 
law of the market instead, which is “put under the authority of Nature herself” (ibid.: 125). This 
quasi-natural law of the market stands for a disembedded stage of law’s development, and its 
redefinition through economics. This is the law of market society, which is at the core of a 
Polanyian approach to the economic sociology of law. In addition, one can also speak of a third 
stage of legal development, which is marked by the rise of “socially oriented legal thought” in the 
twentieth century (Kennedy 2006: 19). This means that law is increasingly understood “as a 
regulatory mechanism that could and should facilitate the evolution of social life in accordance 
with ever greater perceived social interdependence at every level, from the family to the world of 
nations” (ibid.: 22). In short, it becomes an instrument of social engineering and social regulation, 
which is supposed to have a re-embedding effect on the market forces, working towards a more 
‘social’ market economy. 
 
The law of market society, which means the law ‘constitutive’ of the market economy, which is, 
at the same time, ‘constituted’ by liberal economics, can be explored using Polanyi’s concepts of 
institutions and commodities (Frerichs 2016). As an ‘institution’ (among others), law regulates 
the market economy. As a ‘commodity’ (among others), law is itself subject to market forces. 
The first chapter of The Great Transformation (Polanyi 1957 [1944]) describes the historical and 
institutional context of the emergence of market society. Accordingly, “[n]ineteenth century 
civilization rested on four institutions”: the “balance-of-power system”, the “gold standard”, the 
“self-regulating market”, and the “liberal state” (ibid.: 3). Polanyi adds that “[c]lassified in one 
way, two of these institutions were economic, two political” and that “[c]lassified in another way, 
two of them were national, two international” (ibid.). Law is not singled out as an institution; 
however, some form of law, both national and international in scope, is implied by the interplay 
of the above institutions. Polanyi speaks of the “organization” of the world, which he conceives 
not in terms of “centrally directed bodies acting through functionaries of their own” but in terms 
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of the “universally accepted principles” and the “factual elements” on which the international 
order rests (ibid.: 18). Alternatively, one could speak of international economic law, including its 
national underpinnings. 
 
In this overall system, politics is subordinated to economics. With regard to the two national 
institutions, Polanyi makes it clear that “the liberal state was itself a creation of the self-
regulating market” (ibid.: 3). The premise of the liberal state is non-interference in the formation 
and functioning of markets and, namely, the price mechanism (ibid.: 69). In positive terms, this 
means that “only such policies and measures are in order which help to ensure the self-regulation 
of the market by creating conditions which make the market the only organizing power in the 
economic sphere” (ibid.). In practice, such ‘laissez-faire’ policy could entail an enormous 
increase of “control, regulation, and intervention” to make the markets work according to their 
‘own’, disembedded logic (ibid.: 140). Part of this is the creation of what Polanyi refers to as 
‘fictitious commodities’, namely labour, land, and money. These are defined by the fact that they 
are traded on the market but have not been produced for the market in the first place. In other 
words, they are artificially subjected to market forces. From a substantive point of view, “labor is 
only another name for a human activity which goes with life itself” and “land is only another 
name for nature, which is not produced by man” (ibid.: 72). Similarly, money reflects complex 
social relations, such as relations of credit and debt, and cannot be reduced to its equivalence 
function in quasi-anonymous market exchange ‘on the spot’. 
 
In “The Economy as Instituted Process” (2001 [1957]), Polanyi further develops his 
‘substantivist’ approach to the economy. Even though law is not particularly mentioned, it can 
easily be identified as one of the institutions providing the economic process with “[u]nity and 
stability, structure and function, history and policy” (ibid.: 36). Arguably, law plays an important 
role both in the commodification process as well as in reversing it through ‘decommodification’. 
The utopian reality of the market society is based on legal artefacts. Commodification means that 
the fictions of the economic discipline are translated into legal fictions (Supiot 2007: 94). The 
relationship between law and economics is thus twofold: the market is shaped by legal 
institutions, but the law is also shaped by economic thinking. Law is thus a ‘commodifier’ and 
potential ‘decommodifier’ at the same time. 
 
Moreover, by instituting the self-regulating market the law itself may become cognitively 
embedded in economics and ultimately, commodified. In other words, it turns into a means 
serving the ends of the market: of creating competition, increasing efficiency, and furthering 
growth. Law then appears as a production (or consumption) factor, just like labour, land, and 
money (or capital), which has a price. In the microeconomic sense, the commodity character of 
law materialises whenever regulatory competition allows a ‘law market’ to arise (O’Hara and 
Ribstein 2009). A certain legal rule or regime can then be marketed and shopped for at the 
national, regional or global level. In the macroeconomic sense, commodification of the law is 
promoted when the law of the market is enshrined in the form of a liberal economic constitution. 
On the national level, this includes the constitutionalisation of the relation between the self-
regulating market and the liberal or neo-liberal state. On the international level, the same applies 
to monetary regimes that prioritise market forces, such as the classical gold standard, which 
Polanyi (1957 [1944]: 195) described as a “self-regulating mechanism of supplying credit”. If 
this is the commodity form of the law, its original substance may be found in the essence of 
social obligations. For Durkheim (1984 [1893]), law was but a symbol of social solidarity, which 
is embedded in a community of interdependent and mutually committed individuals. In this 
sense, the market society turns the bonds of community into an exchange of commodities, from 
which the law is not exempt. 
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The Transnational Momentum of Economic Constitutionalism 
From a Polanyian point of view, the law of market society includes all types of law that constitute 
or regulate the (allegedly) self-regulating market, that is, ‘enabling’ private law as well as 
‘restrictive’ public law. Together, these ‘market-constitutive’ and ‘market-regulative’ forms of 
law can be summarised as ‘economic law’ (Wirtschaftsrecht), which represents the “‘ordo’ part 
of [the] ordo-liberal model” of economic constitutionalism (Grundmann 2008: 555). Moreover, 
the law of market society not only cuts across public and private law but also concerns both 
national and international law and naturally extends to transnational and supranational law. This 
is captured by a functional definition of economic law, as it is suggested by scholars at the 
interface of law and economics. 
 
In this perspective, international economic law would “not [be] defined by its legal sources but 
rather by its object: the global economic system” (Ortino and Ortino 2008: 94). It is the “law of 
the global economy”, which includes not only “formal laws” but also “informal laws, such as 
non-legally binding customs and practices influencing economic behaviours” (ibid.: 93-94). 
Analogously, Petersmann (2011: 536 and 571) emphasises the “‘functional unity’ of private and 
public, national and international regulation of the economy”, which is reflected in a conception 
of international economic law as “multilevel economic regulation”. Moreover, if the subject of 
regulation is the “transnational division of labour” between “billions of producers, investors, 
traders and consumers” it seems preferable to move from “state-centred ‘top-down conceptions’” 
to “citizen-oriented ‘bottom-up’ conceptions” of international economic law (ibid.: 537, 544, and 
573; original emphasis). Merging this with a “cosmopolitan conception”, which brings the 
‘constitutional rights’ of global citizens to the fore, Petersmann’s vision is that of an 
economically confined “‘multilevel constitutionalism’” (ibid.: 572; cf. 2012: 927). 
In the context of the European Union, and former European (Economic) Community, the 
juridification and constitutionalisation of economic law through treaties and case law is very 
advanced. Even if the European economic constitution is understood in functional terms, its 
formal core is undeniable (Sauter 1998). Tuori and Tuori (2014) distinguish between micro- and 
macro-economic layers of the European economic constitution. 
 
Accordingly, the original Treaty of Rome (1958) primarily consisted in a micro-economic 
constitution focusing on the “behavior of individual economic actors” inasmuch as this has 
“cross-border implications” (ibid.: 16-17). This remained the main emphasis of European 
‘integration through law’ until and beyond the Single European Act (1987) ‘completing’ the 
internal market. Individual actors could invoke their ‘European’ rights to free movement in 
national courts, which could then turn to the European Court of Justice in the so-called 
preliminary reference procedure. Based on the doctrines of supremacy and direct effect, 
developed in the 1960s, market freedoms and competition law could thus be implemented in 
Member States without the need for further Community legislation. Integration through law 
proceeded as ‘integration through courts’ (Sciarra 2001). 
 
A meaningful macro-economic constitution focusing on “aggregate economic objectives and 
economic policies”, such as price stability, was only added to this ‘constitutional’ framework 
with the Treaty of Maastricht (1993), which laid the ground for the monetary union (ibid.: xii). 
Prior to this, the provision of monetary stability had formally been left to the member states and 
substantially been externalised to the system of Bretton Woods (Tuori and Tuori 2014: 19). Since 
Maastricht, the juridification and constitutionalisation of the macro-economic layer has likewise 
been progressing. The Stability and Growth Pact put forward by the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) 
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was meant to enhance fiscal credibility in the Eurozone, but still turned out to be rather 
“toothless”: in the first practical test involving leading Eurozone members, “the strict rules of the 
pact proved to be unenforceable” (Heise 2013: 52). The recent Eurozone crisis then entailed a 
number of reforms leading to a ‘hardened’ regime of fiscal and macroeconomic coordination, 
with the Fiscal Compact (2012) including quasi-automatic sanctions for countries violating the 
deficit criteria. A bone of contention in this process of juridification has been that the posited 
rules seem to be more of an economic than a legal nature: what is the case economically 
(regarding the fiscal situation of a member state) cannot easily be translated into legal 
responsibility (Menéndez 2013: 516-517). Critics speak of efforts to create a new “‘Gold 
Standard without gold”’ (Thomasberger 2015: 195; cf. Wilsher 2014). 
 
If we accept the “gold standard / Eurozone analogy” as valid (Holmes 2014: 584), the European 
economic constitution appears to be the logical outcome of law’s great transformation, that is, its 
development alongside “the rise and fall of market economy”, which Polanyi (1957 [1944]: Part 
II) described for the nineteenth and early twentieth century, and the “reformation” of the market 
economy from the mid-twentieth century onwards (Streeck 2009). Of course, one could go even 
further back in time and find already in the merchant law of medieval times “an essential 
foundation of the laissez-faire capitalist economy that emerged in the nineteenth century” 
(Berman 2003: 377). However, our modern understanding of law and constitutions is premised 
on the civil revolutions and the emergence of the nation-state and, thus, on the division of public 
and private, national and international law (Thornhill 2011: 8-12). The European economic 
constitution embodies the new, transnational drift of the law of market society, which has above 
been described as sectoral constitutionalisation. 
 
In a nutshell, the nineteenth century was characterised by an emphasis on universal legal forms, 
which were supportive of the agenda of economic liberalism (Kennedy 2006: 20). Towards the 
end of the ‘long’ nineteenth century, nationalist tendencies became stronger, ultimately leading to 
the First World War. In the twentieth century, legal thinking came to embrace ‘the social’ (ibid.). 
After the Second World War, the international economic order was built on “embedded 
liberalism”, a compromise between the “two extremes” of “economic liberalism” and “economic 
nationalism” that had clashed before (Ruggie 1982: 393). The law of the welfare state was more 
interventionist and redistributive in its character. In private law, a substantive ‘instrumentalist’ 
rationality gained weight with regard to the formal ‘juridical’ rationality (Michaels 2011). The 
European economic constitution is still in line with this functionalist orientation, but its 
substantive rationality differs from the national welfare state: European economic law promotes 
market regulation but not social redistribution (Joerges 2005). Linking law back to economics, 
the social function of law becomes, at least in tendency, denationalised and depoliticised, if not 
‘privatised’, in the sense of furthering a private choice of law under the premise of regulatory 
competition. 
 
 
Toward a Critical Sociology of Economic Constitutionalism 
In this chapter, economic constitutionalism has been approached from a sociological perspective. 
The starting point has been a functional definition of economic constitutions, and of economic 
law more generally. The term is thus broader than what lawyers may formally understand as the 
constitutionally dignified part of the economic order. At the same time, the ordo- and neo-liberal 
ambition to wed the rule of law with the rule of the market points to an increasing overlap 
between formal and functional definitions of economic constitutions. Moreover, the concept of 
economic constitution has been developed as an ideal type and explored in its cognitive 
embeddedness, but it has not been studied from an ‘internal’ legal point of view: “The use of the 
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word constitution in relation to European economic law […] does not inform us about the validity 
claims of the economic constitution, let alone, its (normative) legitimacy” (Joerges 2005: 465). 
Nevertheless, our sociological use of the functional definition – taking it as ‘given’ by economic 
thinking – is not uncritical. Considering the indubitable cultural significance and political weight 
of economic constitutionalism, the underlying question is what is behind this movement, what are 
its disciplinary origins and governmental effects. 
 
The Weberian and Polanyian perspectives presented in this chapter add to the ongoing debate on 
constitutionalism beyond the state. Modern societies may generally have been conceived in 
national terms by the classical texts of sociology, but the principles of ‘modernisation’ are global 
in character. The functional differentiation and formal rationalisation of social spheres, such as 
the law, the economy, politics, and science, takes place not only within but also across national 
borderlines. With Weber (1978 [1922]: 32), we take the “plurality of contradictory systems of 
order” seriously. The coexistence of different legal orders in the same local context has long been 
discussed under the label of ‘legal pluralism’ in legal anthropology and the sociology of law. In 
contrast, “global legal pluralism” is still a more recent discovery (Michaels 2009: 244), at least in 
the strongholds of legal theory, as is “world societal constitutionalism” (Teubner 2011: 223). 
Whereas studies of legal pluralism have traditionally been concerned with the overlaps and 
conflicts between ‘official legal systems’ on the one hand and ‘cultural normative systems’ on the 
other, many of which were indeed localised, global legal pluralism lays more emphasis on 
‘functional normative systems’, including the ‘economic/capitalist normative system’ (Tamanaha 
2008: 397-399). In its global expansion, the latter is credited with “the most powerful 
contemporary impetus, momentum, and penetration of new norms” (ibid.: 406). This may justify 
singling out the economic order, among other normative systems, for sociological analysis and 
critique. 
 
Even though the rule of the market is transnational in character, the rule of law is usually bound 
to a territory. European constitutional pluralism is still very conscious of questions of 
sovereignty, its location and division. Focusing on Europe, and the European economic 
constitution, make it possible to study how the principles of functional and territorial 
differentiation are articulated between the nation state at the one end of the ‘constitutional 
continuum’ and the world society at the other. Arguably, economic constitutionalism is most 
clearly expressed in the European context because at this level the different ‘geographies’ of the 
rule of law and the rule of the market can be favourably combined. Moreover, from a Polanyian 
point of view, the European economic constitution can be understood as the quintessence of the 
transformation of the law of market society: from its universalist origins in the nineteenth century 
to its national closure in the twentieth century, and to its transnational openings in the twenty-first 
century (Frerichs 2016). The market logic is legally made possible and enforced beyond the state, 
but not without the state. 
 
 
References 
 
Adler, Emanuel; Michael Barnett (eds.) 1998: Security Communities. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 
Albert, Gert, 2007: Idealtypen und das Ziel der Soziologie. In: Berliner Journal für Soziologie, 
Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 51-75 
Beckert, Jens; Streeck, Wolfgang, 2008: Economic Sociology and Political Economy: A 
Programmatic Perspective. MPIfG Working Paper 08/4, Max Planck Institute for the Study of 
Societies [http://www.mpifg.de/pu/workpap/wp08-4.pdf] 
15 
 
Berman, Harold J., 2003: Law and Revolution, II. The Impact of the Protestant Reformations on 
the Western Legal Tradition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 
Blokker, Paul, 2012: Constitutions and Democracy in Post-National Times: A Political-
Sociological Approach. In: Irish Journal of Sociology, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 68-90 
Callon, Michel, 1998: Introduction: The Embeddedness of Economic Markets in Economics. In: 
Callon, Michel (ed.): The Laws of the Markets. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 1-57 
Durkheim, Émile, 1984 [orig. 1893]: The Division of Labour in Society. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Edelman, Lauren B., 2004: Rivers of Law and Contested Terrain: A Law and Society Approach 
to Economic Rationality. In: Law and Society Review, Vol. 38, No. 2, pp. 181-197 
Fischer-Lescano, Andreas; Teubner, Gunther, 2004: Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search For 
Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law. In: Michigan Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 999-1046 
Foucault, Michel, 2008: The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-1979 
(edited by Michel Sennelart). Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan 
Frerichs, Sabine, 2008: Judicial Governance in der europäischen Rechtsgemeinschaft: 
Integration durch Recht jenseits des Staates. Baden-Baden: Nomos 
Frerichs, Sabine, 2009: The Legal Constitution of Market Society: Probing the Economic 
Sociology of Law. In: Economic Sociology – European Electronic Newsletter, Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 
20-25 [http://econsoc.mpifg.de/archive/econ_soc_10-3.pdf] 
Frerichs, Sabine, 2010: Constitutional Ideal Types in the Global Age: A Sociological Review. In: 
Tuori, Kaarlo; Sankari, Suvi (eds.): The Many Constitutions of Europe. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 
69-88 
Frerichs, Sabine, 2011: Re-embedding Neo-liberal Constitutionalism: A Polanyian Case for the 
Economic Sociology of Law. In: Joerges, Christian; Falke, Josef (eds.): Karl Polanyi, 
Globalisation and the Potential of Law in Transnational Markets. Oxford: Hart Publishing, pp. 
65-84 
Frerichs, Sabine, 2012: What Constitutes the Market Society? Studies in the Economic Sociology 
of Law. Habilitation thesis, University of Bamberg 
Frerichs, Sabine, 2016: The Law of Market Society: A Sociology of International Economic Law 
and Beyond. In: Finnish Yearbook of International Law 2012/2013, Vol. 23, pp. 173-237. 
Gephart, Werner, 1993: Gesellschaftstheorie und Recht: Das Recht im soziologischen Diskurs 
der Moderne. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp. 
Gephart, Werner, 2003: Einführung in die Rechtssoziologie Max Webers. Vorlesung im 
Sommersemester 2003. [https://www.politik-soziologie.uni-bonn.de/de/institut/lehrkoerper/kaete-
hamburger-kolleg-recht-als-kultur/prof.-dr.-werner-
gephart/Gephart_Webers_Rechtssoziologie_SS03.doc] 
Granovetter, Mark, 1985: Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness. 
In: American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 91, No. 3, pp. 481-510 
Grundmann, Stefan, 2008: The Concept of the Private Law Society: After 50 Years of European 
and European Business Law. In: European Review of Private Law, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 553-581 
Heise, Michael, 2013: Emerging from the Euro Debt Crisis: Making the Single Currency Work. 
Berlin: Springer 
Hirst, Paul, 1994: Associative Democracy: New Forms of Economic and Social Governance. 
Cambridge: Polity Press 
Holmes, Christopher, 2014: ‘Whatever It Takes’: Polanyian Perspectives on the Eurozone Crisis 
and the Gold Standard. In: Economy and Society, Vol. 43, No. 4, pp. 582-602 
Joerges, Christian, 2005: What is Left of the European Economic Constitution? A Melancholic 
Eulogy. In: European Law Review, Vol. 30, No. 4, pp. 461- 489 
16 
 
Kennedy, Duncan, 2006: Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-2000. In: 
Trubek, David M.; Santos, Alvaro (eds.): The New Law and Economic Development. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 19-73 
Lang, Andrew T.F., 2013: The Legal Construction of Economic Rationalities. In: Journal of Law 
and Society, Vol. 40, No. 1, pp. 155-171 
Lindbekk, Tore, 1992: The Weberian Ideal-type: Development and Continuities. In: Acta 
Sociologica, Vol. 35, No. 4, pp. 285-297 
Menéndez, Agustín José, 2013: The Existential Crisis of the European Union. In: German Law 
Journal, Vol. 14, No. 5, pp. 453-526 
Michaels, Ralf, 2009: Global Legal Pluralism. In: Annual Review of Law and Social Science, Vol. 
5, pp. 243-262 
Michaels, Ralf, 2011: Of Islands and the Ocean: The Two Rationalities of European Private Law. 
In: Brownsword, Roger; Micklitz, Hans-W., Niglia, Leone; Weatherill, Stephen (eds.): The 
Foundations of European Private Law. Oxford: Hart Publishing pp. 139-158 
Münch, Richard; Frerichs, Sabine, 2008: Markt und Moral: Transnationale Arbeitsteilung und 
Netzwerksolidarität. In: Maurer, Andrea (ed.) Handbuch der Wirtschaftssoziologie. Wiesbaden: 
Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, pp. 394–410 
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 2005 [orig. 1872]: Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik. 
Project Gutenberg. [http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/7206] 
O’Hara, Erin A.; Ribstein, Larry E., 2009: The Law Market. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Ortino, Federico; Ortino, Matteo, 2008: Law of the Global Economy: In Need of a New 
Methodological Approach? In: Picker, Colin B.; Bunn, Isabella D.; Arner, Douglas W. (eds.): 
International Economic Law: The State and Future of the Discipline. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
pp. 89-106 
Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich, 2011: The Future of International Economic Law: A Research Agenda. 
In: Joerges, Christian; Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich (eds.): Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade 
Governance and International Economic Law. Oxford: Hart Publishing, pp. 533-575 
Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich, 2012: Methodological Pluralism and Its Critics in International 
Economic Law Research. In: Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 15, No. 4, pp. 921-
970 
Polanyi, Karl, 1957 [orig. 1944]: The Great Transformation. Boston: Beacon Press 
Polanyi, Karl, 1996 [orig. 1947]: Our Obsolete Market Mentality. In: Swedberg, Richard (ed.): 
Economic Sociology. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 146-154 
Polanyi, Karl, 2001 [orig. 1957]: The Economy as Instituted Process. In: Granovetter, Mark; 
Swedberg, Richard (eds.): The Sociology of Economic Life (second edition). Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, pp. 31-50 
Rex, John, 1977: Value-Relevance, Scientific Laws, and Ideal Types: The Sociological 
Methodology of Max Weber. In: Canadian Journal of Sociology, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 151-166 
Ruggie, John Gerard, 1982: International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded 
Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order. In: International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2, pp. 
379-415. 
Sauter, Wolf, 1998: The Economic Constitution of the European Union. In: Columbia Journal of 
European Law, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 27-68 
Sciarra, Silvana, 2001: Integration Through Courts: Article 177 as a Pre-federal Device. In: 
Sciarra, Silvana (ed.): Labour Law in the Courts. National Judges and the European Court of 
Justice. Oxford: Hart Publishing, pp. 1-30 
Streeck, Wolfgang, 2009: Re-forming Capitalism: Institutional Change in the German Political 
Economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Supiot, Alain, 2007: Homo Juridicus: On the Anthropological Function of the Law. London: 
Verso 
17 
 
Swedberg, Richard, 2003: The Case for an Economic Sociology of Law. In: Theory and Society, 
Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 1-37 
Swedberg, Richard, 2006: Max Weber’s Contribution to the Economic Sociology of Law. In: 
Annual Review of Law and Social Science, Vol. 2, pp. 61-81 
Tamanaha, Brian Z., 2008: Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global. In: 
Sydney Law Review, Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 375-411 
Teubner, Gunther, 2011: Constitutionalizing Polycontexturality. In: Social & Legal Studies, Vol. 
20, No. 2, pp. 210-229 
Thomasberger, Claus, 2015: Europe at a Crossroads: Failed Ideas, Fictional Facts, and Fatal 
Consequences. In: Forum for Social Economics, Vol. 44, No. 2, pp. 179-200 
Thornhill, Chris, 2011: A Sociology of Constitutions: Constitutions and State Legitimacy in 
Historical-Sociological Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Tuori, Kaarlo, 2010: The Many Constitutions of Europe. In: Tuori, Kaarlo, Sankari, Suvi (eds.): 
The Many Constitutions of Europe. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 3-30 
Tuori, Kaarlo, 2015: European Constitutionalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Tuori, Kaarlo; Tuori, Klaus, 2014: The Eurozone Crisis: A Constitutional Analysis. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 
Walker, Neil, 2002: The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism. In: Modern Law Review, Vol. 65, No. 
3, pp. 317-359 
Weber, Max, 1978 [orig. 1922]: Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, 
edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich. Berkeley: University of California Press 
Weber, Max, 1981 [orig. 1913]: Some Categories of Interpretive Sociology. In: Sociological 
Inquiry, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 151-180 
Weber, Max, 2004 [orig. 1904]: The ‘Objectivity’ of Knowledge in Social Science and Social 
Policy. In: Whimster, Sam (ed.): Essential Weber: A Reader. London: Routledge, pp. 359-404 
Wilsher, Daniel, 2014: Law and the Financial Crisis: Searching for Europe’s New Gold Standard. 
In: European Law Journal, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 241-283 
Zafirovski, Milan, 2001: Sociology of Economics or Sociology of Economy? Theoretical-
Methodological Arguments for Sociological Economics. In: Forum for Social Economics, Vol. 
31, No. 1, pp. 27-58 
 
